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LEGAL ETHICS
By JUDGE ROBERT L. STOUT, of the Versailles Bar.
The history of Kentucky jurisprudence discloses a woful lack of knowledge of Legal Ethics, but for which ignorance, great shame, mortification
and humiliation need not have been endured. This history is referred to
only for 4ihe purpose of calling attention to the importance of the subject. It
is a subject of such vast importance and wide score, embracing as it does
the whole conduct and duty of the lawyer, in all his relations to life and
citizenship, as to preclude anything but a cursory presentation,
For the sake of convenience the subject has been divided and will be
tWeated under four (4) different heads, to-wit: The lawyer's duty as a citizen, his duty to his client, his relation to the bar, and to the court and jury.
Taking ithe subdivisions in the order indicated. His first duty is as the
citizen, and perhaps when this duty is well done, it embraces all tile others.
Go to any civilized, enlightened, cultured community and the general
rule is that the foremost, most influeritial citizens of that community are its
lawyers; there must be reason for this, and reason there is. The high-class
lawyer is the man who deals with his fellow men fairly, honestly and candidly. He is an exemplar. His fellow citizens look to him for leadership
and direction, therefore what must be his life and the living of it? First of
all he ought to be a man of strong chaacter, standing for the law and its
proper enforcement; no lawlessness should ever be countenanced by him, no
matter what the provocation may be or the natural bent of his personal
feeling. The most certain and effective way -for the profession to become
an offense, a byword and hissing, is for the lawyers to uphold or connive at
lawlessness.
The lawyer ought to be mindful of the welfare of the state; he is, or
should be, the educator in temporal affairs, as the prelate is, or should be,
in spiritual affairs; to this end his -habitsought to be strong and clear, his
conversation chaste, his morals above reproach, his associates, men of quality. His learning should partake of a more general and universal character
than that of any other profession.
In his private affairs, in the every day dealing with his neighbors, he
ought to be a model citizen. His financial credit ought to be absolutely
unquestioned; there must be with him no dodging the collector, when that
begins, his influence is on the down grade. The lawyer must never be a
stirrer up of strife, and particularly must be avoid litigation of a personal
nature; but if he is compelled by his adversary, _o_-q,.tp,14yAt him not
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Piead his own cause, for verily there is no maxim truer than that "The
lawyer whbo pleads his own case has a fool for a client." The most embarrassing thing to bench, bar and jury is the lawyer pleading his own cause,
totally unconscious of the unmitigated asininity of his performance. (I feel
that it is almost an insult to your intelligence to mention this, but there
are members of the profession who are guilty of this enormity in defiance
of all requirements of common every day decency.)
The lawyer's duty as a citizen is not ait all confined to his dealings
with client and court; he owes public duties, the performance of 'Which frequently entails great sacrifice and financial loss, and one of the greatest of
these is the duty of aiding his state or nation to make the laws. The
greatest strength of a government is its legislative strength, and legislation
is largely in the hands of lawyers. The next greatest strength is its strength
of jurisprudence, which is almost entirely in the lawyer's hands. Legislation
announces the law. Jurisprudence pronounces or interprets it. Can any
one fail to see the paramount duty of the lawyer as a citizen when he is
called to either of these stations? The paramount law is the Constitution,
upon which rock so many laws split and go to wreck. If lawyers do not
control or direct legislation, inextricable confusion must inevitably result,
for a knowledge of Constitutional law and of (onstitutions must guide and
restrain legislators. It used to be, that Americans held in veneration the
fundamental law of the Constitution. The great Chief Justice, John Marshall, in the case of Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 177, made this statement
which ought to forever set at rest and conclude the matter:
"It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule
to particular causes must, of necessity, expound and interpret
that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must
decide on the operation. of each. So if a law be in opposition
to the Constitution, if both the law and the constitution apply
to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that
case conformably to the law, disregarding the Constitution, or
conformably to the Constitution, disregarding the law; the
Court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs
the case. This is of the- very essence of judicial duty. If, then,
the courts are to regard the Constitution, and the Constitution
is superior to any ordinary act of the Legislature, the Constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which
they both apply. Those, then, 'who controvert the principle that
the Constijtution is to be considered in court as a paramount
law, are reduced to the necessity of maintaining that courts
must close theiW eyes on the Constitution and see only the law.
This dodtrine would subvert the every foundation of all written
Constitutions. It would declare that an act, which, according to
the principles and theory of our government, is entirely void, is
yet, in practice, completely obligatory. It would declare that, if
the Legislature shall do what is expressly forbidden, such act,
notwithstanding the express prohibition, is, in reality, effectual.
It would be giving to the Legislature a practical and real omnipotence with the same breath which professes to restrict their
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powers within narrow limits. It is prescribing limits and declaring that those limits may be passed at pleasure."
This statement of the Court's opinion presents an unanswerable argument upon the question of the supremacy of the Constitution. No question
for a Court's determination ever arises but that the bar materially aids
the bench in reaching a proper conclusion or judgment, so that the lawyer
has all to do with the jurisprudence of his country. His duty to the Court
along other lines will be hereinafter considered.
The Emperor Justinian promulgated a code of law which to this day
is known as "Justinian's Code; but 'twas hinted in Rome and whispered
aloud in the Forum that the real moving spirit in the compilation of that
system was Tribonian-that Tibonian, the lawyer, furished the brains, in
order that Justinian, the Emperor, might be immortalized. The lawyer's
glory was that he had done a great thing for his countrymen and his contemporaries believe it true that"When our Souls shall leave this dwelling
The glory of one fair and virtuous action
Is above all the scutcheons.'on our tomb."
With this brief and frame-like statement of your duty as a citizen, we
take up the duty to your client. The Common Law of England has been
described epigrammatically as "the perfection of human reason." This is
apparently extravagant, but when the sources from which it sprung are
examined, tle experiences which fostered and developed it, are even dimly
realized, and the conditions surrounding its operation are presented, we
know 'twas no extravagant admirer who so designated it. That law recognized certain relations as so intimate, confidential and sacredly necessary,
that it would not permit communications made -in pursuance and because
of that relationship to be divulged in a court of justice, under any pressure
of circumstance or necessity. One of those relations was and is that of
the lawyer to his client, another, that of husband and wife, and still
another was -perhaps that of priest and confessing pentinent. The sanctity
of the company in wbich 'you find yourselves ought to give you pause and
compel a realization of the great trust which in you is confided, of the great
responsibility which on you rests. Nothing snort of absolute truth, fidelity,
candor and honesty must nor can be tolerated: you must be as true to your
client as the husband to the wife, as priest to conscience stricken penitent.
Legally you are responsible to .your client only for want of ordinary
care and ordinary skill. If you are. deficient in those attributes, you probably will not be annoyed by many clients, so the legal responsibility need
not give you great concern. However, you are not required, not even
expected 'to know a.l the law all the time or any time. C. J. Abbott, .atterwards Lord'.Tenterden, said, "No attorney is bound to know all the law.
God forbid that it should be imagined that an attorney or a counsel, or
even a judge, is bound to know all the 'law; or that an attorney is to lose
his fair recompense on account of an error, being'such an error as:a
cautious man might fall into."--Montrion v. Jeffreys, 2 C. & P. 113 (12 E.
C. L. R. 50).
While it has been adjudicated that you are not even expected to know
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all the law, yet that does not mean that you are not to master all the law
and all the facts, too, in the particular case entrusted to your care and
direction. A simple senge of fair dealing demands that you do master every
scintilla of law and fact bearing upon your case; for that your client has
the right to expect, nay, to demand. Whem your client's property, reputation, liberty, or his very life are placed in your hands, can your conscience
remain quiet or unaccusing until you have done your best endeavor? If
you do not give him your best efforts, if you are conscious of your delinquency, you either find your peace destroyed or you are unworthy of the
high office of attorney-at-law.
You may -have heard something of the lawyer who takes cases the
fee depending upon the contingency of success; this is to de diiscouraged
and discountenanced as a general rule. It is related of one of our most
distinguished jurists, explanatory of the contingent fee, that upon one
occasion he told his client who had stated his case, that he would take it
upon a contingent fee. The client looked puzzled, scratched his head and
finally said, "Say, Mr. Blank, what is a contingent fee?" "Well," said Mr.
Blank, "it is this: If we get nothing by our suit, I get nothing. If we
win the suit, you get nothing." The ambulance chaser" is a discredit to
and the disgraceful part of. the profession; however, it must not be supposed or presumed that every lawyer who brings his suit for damages for
personal injury inflicted is an "ambulance chaser." The right for redress
for wrongful injury to the person is just as sacred as any other right guaranteed by the laws of our land and the lawyer who represents, honestly and
decently, one seeking such redress is just as honorable, just as much
entitled to the respect of ais brethren, as any other lawyer in any other
case; attempts to discredit him are just as reprehensible and contemptible
as the practices of the most confirmed "ambulance chaser." The "ambulance chaser" has no place in the ranks of the professioh; he frequently
is a suborner of perjury, always a solicitor of the business which ought
never to be. It is questionable if a lawyer ought to advertise even to the
extent of putting his professional card in the newspaper; the clients must
come to him, or he must be without clientele.
The lawyer must not be too conservative though; he ought to mingle
and associate freely with the people, else bow can he know the juries
called to try his client's cause? To know your jury is a most important
equipment; many an excellent case has been lost because a juror's prejudices and passions were unknown to the party accepting him. Some men
are ignorant of their own, bias or .pejudice-but these same prejudices are
known to every one of his acquaintances-when that sort of man is put
upon his oath on the voir dire, he unhesitatingly qualifies as a competent
juror, and honestly too. If you knew the existence of the disqualification,
he would hardly sit upon your client's case unless your peremptory challenges were exhausted.
The topic of your duty to your client presents many problems most
difficult of satisfactory solution. The boundary of your duty is very clear
and plain when your client's contention coincides with your own ideas of
justice and propriety. The other end of the question Is not so easily solved.
If your client's demand does not meet your own approval, notwithstanding
which, you undertake Its prosecution, what then is your duty to him? "That
lawyers awe as often ministers of Injustice as of justice, Is the commoil

Kentucky Law Journal

5

accusation in tihe mouth of gainsayers against the profession. It is said
there. must be a right side and a wrong side to every lawsuit. In the
majority of cases it must be apparent to the advocate, on which side is
the justice cf the cause; yet he will maintain, and often with the appearance of warmth and earnestness, that side which he must know to be
unjust, and the success of which will be a wrong to the opposite, party.
Is he not then a participant in the injustice? It may be answered in. general: Every case is to be decided by the tribunal before which it is brought
for adjudication, upon the evidence, and upon the principles of law applicable
to the facts as they appear upon the evidence. No court or jury are invested
with any arbitrary discretion to determine a cause according to their mere
notions of justice. Such a discretion invested in any body of men would
constitute the most appalling of despotisms. Law, and justice according
to law-this is the only secure principle upon which the controversies of
men can be decided. It is better, on the whole, that a few particular cases.
ef hardship and injustice, arising from defect of evidence or the unbending
character of some strict rule of law, should be endured, than that general
insecurity should prevade the community, from the arbitrary discretion. of
the judge.- It Is this which has blighted the countries of the East as much
as cruel laws or despotic executives. Thus tile Legislature has seen. fit
in certain cases to assign a limit to the period within which actions shall
be brought, in order to urge men to vigilance, and to prevent stale claims
from being suddenly received against men whose vouchers are destroyed
or whose witnesses are dead. It is true, in foro conscientiae, a defendanit
who knows that he honestly owes the debt sued for, and that the delay
has been caused by indulgence or confidence on the pawt of his creditor,
ought not to plead the statute. But if he does plead it, the judgment of
the court must be in his favor.
Now the lawyer is not merely the agent of the party; he is an officer
of the court. The party has a right to have .his case decided upon the law
and the evidence, and to have every view presented to the minds of the
judges, which can legitimately bear upon the queston. This is the -office
which the advocate performs. He is not morally vesponsible for the act
of the party in maintaining an unjust cause, nor for the error of the court,
If they fall into error, in deciding in his favor. The court or jury. ought
certainly to hear and weigh both sides; and the office of the counsel Is to
assist them by doing that, which the client in person, from want of learning, experience and address, is unable to do. in a proper manner. The
lawyer who Tefuses his -professional assistance because in his judgment the
case is unjust and indefensible usurps the functions of both judge and

jury."
You are not compelled to accept employment in any case, but after you
have accepted it you are not to constitute. yourself both judge and jury.
This view, it seems to me, meets any sweeping objection which may be
made as indicated. Each particular case stands -upon its own merits and
you will have to be the final abriters as to the cases you take.
Those who are disposed to ridicule and belittle the sincerity of the
profession frequently ask why lawyers defend men -whom they know to be
guilty of crime with which they stand charged.
Mhat question is easily
disposed of: The law is extremely jealous of the lives and liberties of all
men; in that jealousy it has hedged about the accused of crime, first of
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all, the presumption that he is innocent, (2) that he must be proven guilty
to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt, (3) that every'fact and circumstance
necessary to constitute his guilt must be established to the satisfaction of
the jury beyond a reasonable doubt (4) that those facts must be established
-by legal evidence and (5) that the jury shall be told or instructed, as to all
the law of his particular case. Now, no matter what the guilt of the
accused, he is entitled 'to every right the law affords him; he cannot obtain
those rights if lawyers should refuse to appear in his behalf, or be denied
him. If he can be deprived of these or of any safeguards vouchsafed by
law, why then the innocent may also be depaived, for we all know that
before the law "all men are equal." Every man has the inalienable right
to have his case presented legally-to have only legal evidence produced
against him and to have the law, applicable to his case, properly and correctly expounded. You may fully, freely and with clear conscience, defend
anjy man charged with any crime, in order that he may have a trial according to law; any other trial is but a farce-is but legalized, judicial lynching.
So we may defend any criminal, at least to the extent indicated. You
are not expected to assert your personal opinion in any case, indeed, in
strict propriety, yo ought never to inject into your argument your ownpersonal views or opinions; you are fairly to aid both court and jury by
presenting legal evidence in a.legal manner, by using such arguments as
the facts justify and your personality ought to have no bearing, no influence
at all in the matter. I may be permitted to say that your duty to your
client never requires you to surrender or smirch your self-respect, your
manhood, your character or your conscience. If a case presents itself
involving any one of these, flee fom it as from. the plague.
As a parting injunction on the subject of your duty to your client, let
me beg of you at all times, under all circumstances; keep your temper
under perfect control If you, naturally are high or quick-tempered, you
must be always on guard, ever watchful lest that most insidious and crafty
of enemies overcomes you. With your temper goes the clearness of mental
vision, and your speech becomes both intemperate and illogical: your adversary has you at a fearful disadvantage which even he cannot forego, since
you, yourself, furnish vantage poiit and arms to him. It may have beenit could surely have been with the greatest certainty spoken of the lawyer:
"Quos, Deus, vult perdere, dementta."
You then not only owe it to
yourself to keep your temper, but you owe it to your client. You have no
right to destroy yourself when that destruction carries'with it the life,
fortune or reputation of him who has entrusted it to you for protection or
preservation.
Your duty to the members of the bar is generally and ought always to
be in its performance, the pleasure of your professional life. The life of
the lawyer is essentially the "Strenuous Life," made endurable by the
little civilities and amenities mutually extended in the brotherhood-Legal
Fraternity it is called and brotherly love should abound. It ought to be that
"No quarrels have we of our own
We manage other' broils
And though we fight with all our might
We've buttons on our foils."
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However, sometimes I have seen a lawyer abuse his fellow lawyer on
the other side, indulge in harsh criticism and make himself generally obnoxious. An old lawyer told me that his rule was: If you have a bad case
vilify the other side, you may raise such a dust that tihe real issue will
be lost or obscured. I believe that his rule, or rather -its reason, is the
only justification, excuse or palliation for such conduct.
We subscribe to neither rule nor reason; and say most emphatically
don't.
Never accept employment from litigant who has counsel, unless that
counsel is consulted and heartily consents for you to co-operate with him.
If you depart fiom this advice, it will often be to your humiliation and
mortification-it will always be at the expense of loss of position among
your brethren. To lose your brother lawyers' good opinion is a serious
matter and must be quickly followed by the loss of the good opinion, of
the public. The outcast lawyer is the niost pitiable spectacle in professional
life, unless it be the outcast preacher and they are such rarities as not to
2ount.
Another excellent way to lose caste in the profession is to settle your
controversy di.rectly with the litigant. No reasons here given specifically.
I prefer to leave that to your imagination. I believe it was Sir Galahad
who spoke no slander, nor listened to it. Speak no disparaging thing of
your brother at the bar. If (he offend, go to him, aid, comfort, advise and
counsel him; if he be worthy of saving, save him. If he be unworthy, deal
as gently with him as you can.
No matter how formidable, or how eminent and distinguished your
opposing counsel may be, do not fear him, and above all, do not fear him
so much as to be discourteous. Remember that your knowledge of the
law, so far as it goes, is as good and valuable as his. The law is the same
for you as it is for him. In such a predicament, if your cause is just, you
know that you are thrice-armed-which seems sometimes but a poor, feeble
equipment.
Now the last rule I shall lay down for your guid~nce among your bhaoVter
lawyers applies with equal force to all your relations with life, and, like
the name of Abou Ben Adhem, "leads all the rest." It is this: Always,
everywhere-be a gentleman.
In the fourth relation, a disregard .ofthe rule, just promulgated, makes
the delinquent a sadder, but poorer man, but the disregard is so infrequent,
that it shocks and horrifies bench, bar, jury and audience, when a lawlyer is
guilty of ungentlemanly conduct to the Court. The bar is always courteous
to Court and jury, as Court and jury are courteous to bar. It seems strange
then to adknonish you -notto be discourteous, not to reflect upon the integrity
of' the Court.
Surely no one need be admonished that it is not proper or permissible
to use such language as follows, in framing a petition for rehearing, to-wit:'
"Your honors have rendered an unjust decree. The opinion is not in accordance with the facts of the case, and will be a source of regret to this count
The record has not been carefully examined and hundreds of pages have
been entirely overlooked. Facts have been assumed whicl have no place
In the proof,- and 'others have been ignored which stood out on: every page.
Witi piofound respet,'fi6t simultated6 but real, I say. that I fear this hon-
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orable court was more attracted by the argument of counsel than by the
literature of the record.
"I must not be misunderstood by these remarks. It is not in me or
,)f me .to cast reflections upon this honorable court. To do so were unprofessional, and I cherish no sentiment in accord with such a course. But
the very aim and purpose of a petition for rehearing, the very nature of
Its existence, is to subject the action of the bench to a temperate but
searching criticism of the bar. Wherefore, in obedience to my sworn and
eaxnest duty to shield my client against injustice, I say, with abundant
deference and unfeigned respect, that the opinion which this honorable
court has rendered contradicts the undisputed facts on two hundred and
fifty pages of record. My only excuse for making such statements is their
truth, and I must now prove that they are true.", Then follows the argument the attorney submitted. After which he concludes: "Your honors
reversed the chancellor -upon the, law and reversed him upon the facts, and
then afirmed- all he decided. This cap only be explained upon the ground
that it takes two negatives to pnake an affirmative.
"But there is still worse behind. It is not the custom to copy vouchers
in full in the records taken to this court. The repoft of the commissioner or
comments of the chancellor have usually been considered sufficient copies.
But after I saw the irregular opinion in this case, I sued out a certiorari,
and brought to this court full copies of one hundred and thirty-one vouchers,
running through the whole existence of the trust, and filling more than
one hundred pages. Every one of these vouchers shows that H. G. alone
held the funds, and that 0. G. is as completely- a stranger to them as the
learned and respected judges of -whom I am begging accurate justice. And
yet your honors say not that the evidence is conflicting or insufficient, but
that my client 'wholly failed to- prove' that H. G. received the money. I
have tried to be respectful because I feel so; but I have the right to complain of negligent reading of the records, and to appear in this honorable
court and stand pro testem -for the bar. A ruinous and disastrous decree
has been rendered against my client, who is proved to be as wholly innocent of all offenses. as those whom I have the honor to address. Indifference
to the record may work his ruin, but it will not elevate the cause of administrative justice.
"All this is careless. It is very hard for my client that the record is
not read as accurately by the bench as it was prepared by the bar. No
error should be allowed .to soil the judgment of an upright and impartial
court, and to avoid that in this case a rehearing should be instantly granted,
so that the former opinion may do no wrong to a suitor at the bar."
The counsel in that paper, if you can believe it was filed as quoted,
charged the highest court in our state (1) that it had overlooked the facts
in the case; (2) that it had assumed facts having no place in the record;
(3) that it had ignored facts standing out on every page of the record; (4)
that it was careless and indifferent to the rights of a litigant, and (5) that
the result of that carelessness and indifference was 'a ruinous, disastrous
and unjust judgment against a party wholly innocent of offense. That
petition was actually filed in the Court of Appeals of the State of Kentucky
by one of the most distinguished and ablest lawyers in the history of the
state. He was a man of -powerful intellect, of wonderful ability and learnIng, yet he committed this enormity contrary to the canons of all Ethics.
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He did it because he never regarded a rule I have laid down for your careful, prayerful consideration, viz: At all times, under all circumstancei, keep
your temper under perfect control I refrain from giving the name of this
eminent lawyer-for he was an eminent lawyer in spite of his frailty-for
the reason that "Nihil de mortuiis, nisi bonum."
Candor and honesty must always characterize your dealings with a.
court, but it must not be that mistaken candor, which is only rudeness,
nor that honesty .which is only used to vent ill-temper.
You may try, and perhaps successfully for a time, to deceive or mislead the court. Your deception will, sooner or later, usually sooner, be discovered, then youT usefulness before that court is over, gone, forever gone.
You ought always in this connection to have before you that you are an
officer of the court, an officer sworn just as'the court itself is sworn, to
faithfully perform your duties as an attorney-at-law; when you aaie in. the
discharge of your swor6 duty, acting within and for your rights, do no act
for which you feel it necessary or advisable to apologize, and never expect
the court to apologize to you for his decision. An apology signifies at least
that the act needs some excusing-if not positive defending. So do nothing
which needs defending or excusing and apology will be unknown.
The most perfectly courteous lawyer I ever observed in a court,
courteous with a graceful, charming courtesy to bench, bar, witness and
jury, was the late lamented Col. W. C. P. Breckinridge. How bften' have
I heard him in excepting to the ruling of the trial court; say with *a
"deferential bow: "Perhaps I am wrong in my contentiohis, but with the permission of the court, I will except -to your honor's rulifig, and save the que6stion." Is it possible that Colonel Breckina-idge's client suffered because of
the courtesy and deference 'paid by counsel to client? The question 'answers
Itself.
As for your relation to the jury "experience is the best teacher." The
jury itself will teach every lawyer the duty that he owes to it. I may say
though that it Is the lawyer's duty to aid the jury in making a righteous
verdict, not to confuse or obstruct them. And if you fail in your duty to the
jury, you are going to find it out and that quickly.
Remember the admonition and warning- of Lord Bolingbroke: "The pro
fession of the law, in its nature 'the noblest and most bmeneficial to mankind, Is in its abuse and abasement the most sordid and pernicious."

